lying socially constructed modes of thinking can be reconciled with the conservative agenda of objectivity and nonpartisanship. This approach obliges teachers to raise in class the question of their own partisan biases and how they can most honestly be dealt with in pedagogy and grading; I have found that students are immensely relieved at being able to discuss this taboo subject openly, to come to an open accord with the instructor about what guidelines are most fair, and to evaluate the instructor's fairness at the end of the course accordingly.
The most economical way of concretizing my theoretical position and tacitly answering likely objections to it is to provide an outline of the schema's central components in the form of four units of study that can be integrated into a writing course such as the one I teach as my department's second term of freshman English, a course devoted to argumentative and source-based writing and the research paper.2 These units coincide with the preliminary stages of researching and writing a term paper on a topic of current public controversy, a paper which consists of a rhetorical analysis of sources expressing opposing ideological viewpoints on the topic. The units provide a pedagogical context for seven appendices, which form the substantive core of the schema. The appendices provide the kind of guides to locating and analyzing partisan sources that have only recently started to show up in writing textbooks (e.g. Mayfield 236-63), and I hope my version will prompt other writers to incorporate them in textbooks, as I am doing myself in a textbook in progress.
If, as is almost inevitable, I sometimes let my own partisanship bias my presentation, I think that, far from discrediting my general intention, this will only illustrate and validate it. An implicit message of my approach to teaching political conflict is that any effort to construct such a schema is itself bound to be captive, in some measure, to the partisan biases it sets out to analyze. The only possible way to transcend these biases is refinement through dialectical exchanges with those of differing ideologies. So much the better, then, if readers who find fault with my definitions, interrelations among ideological positions, or predictable lines of partisan rhetoric can suggest modifications that will bring the schema closer to the difficult ideal of acceptability to those of any reasoned ideology; I regularly modify and update it myself in response to student suggestions in class. I hope that my beginnings here will prompt ongoing professional debate on these points and thereby help bring such debate into the forefront of composition theory.
The content of this schema and the four course units it is keyed to do not dictate any particular pedagogical model. Nor do their emphases on specific subject matter related to politics contradict the current emphasis in the profession on the writing process; on the contrary, the sequence of topics and assignments shows how process instruction can be extended to critical thinking, reading, and writing about political subject matter, while the appendices constitute a heuristic for the process of working the analysis of partisan rhetoric into an outline for the term paper.
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As a final introductory note, I need to respond to the concerns of Hairston and other critics that writing instructors are venturing out of their own field of expertise when they address political issues. The level at which these issues are analyzed in a course like the one I describe here is that at which they are addressed, not in scholarly studies, but in political speeches, news and entertainment media, op-ed columns, general-circulation journals of opinion, and other realms of public discourse to which everyone is exposed every day. The political vocabulary and information covered here are no more specialized than what every citizen in a democracy should be expected to know, even before taking a college argumentative and research writing course. Indeed, two of the main points that must be stressed throughout such a course are the difference in levels of rhetoric between public and scholarly treatments of political issues and the need for students to take more specialized courses to gain deeper knowledge of these issues. Students can learn in writing classes, though, to develop a more complex and comprehensive rhetorical understanding of political events and ideologies than that provided by campaign propaganda and mass media-or, for that matter, by most social science courses, whose emphasis is empirical rather than rhetorical. Higher education in composition as well as literature has the unique, Emersonian mission of bringing to bear on current events the longer view, the synthesizing vision needed to counteract the hurriedness, atomization, and ideological hodgepodge that debase our public discourse as well as our overdepartmentalized curricula and overspecialized scholarship.
Four Units for Teaching Political Conflicts
Political Semantics
This first topic in the schema can be integrated into a standard argumentative and research writing course with a review, within a General Semantics perspective, of definition, denotation, and connotation. This review provides a context for discussion of racism and sexism through study of selections from the large body of writings analyzing the role of definition and connotative language in the social construction of racial and gender identity, and of other issues in which control of definitions functions as a form of social power. Analysis of readings with opposing viewpoints on race and gender can focus on the semantic intricacies involved in current disputes over "political correctness," limits on free speech, tolerance of intolerance, and "reverse discrimination."
The unit continues with study of the problems of subjectivity involved in defining political terms, including the way partisan biases color our perception of these terms' meaning, through ambiguous or selective definitions, unconcretized abstractions, connotative associations and slanting, etc. Students are assigned to look up in one or more dictionaries the following terms: "conservatism," "liberalism," "libertarianism," "radicalism," "right wing," "left
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wing," "fascism," "plutocracy," "capitalism," "socialism," "communism," "Marxism," "patriotism," "democracy," "totalitarianism," "freedom," and "free enterprise." Then they bring their different dictionaries to class and read aloud the multiple and varying definitions for each word. In this way, students learn that understanding these terms and using them accurately in spoken or written discourse are complicated, not only by each dictionary's giving several meanings for each word but by differences among various dictionaries (and from one edition to another of the same dictionary-a nice lesson in historical subjectivity). Furthermore, even the largest unabridged dictionary fails to cover the almost infinite number of senses in which "liberal," "conservative," "socialist," "communist," and "Marxist" are used throughout the world, or the equally immense diversity of political factions which identify themselves with each of these ideologies. In America alone, a conservative may be a Menckenian aristocrat, a Donald Trump-type corporate capitalist, a Moral Majority populist, a Ku Klux Klanner, a member of the Libertarian Party, etc. And yet our mass media chronically use conservative either without any definition at all or as a simplistic label, as though it had one and only one meaning. Many Democratic and Republican Party politicians consciously evade any consistent definition of their ideology in an unscrupulous attempt to woo the widest possible constituency; hence they almost inevitably must resort to doublespeak.
This dictionary exercise can point up another widespread semantic confusion in our public discourse, the false equation of political terms like "democracy," "freedom," "justice," "patriotism," and "dictatorship" with words referring to economic systems-"capitalism" or "free enterprise" and "socialism." One must again go beyond dictionary definitions to address the problematic relation between these political and economic terms, for partisans of varying ideologies posit differing connections between, say, freedom and democracy on one hand and capitalism and socialism on the other. In Appendix Six, I have attempted to present my own definitions of these relations as objectively as possible, but, as I make clear to students, scholars whose ideological convictions differ from mine might take issue and present a quite different set of definitions. Indeed, the larger rhetorical question (a vital one for both class exercises and theoretical inquiry by English scholars) is whether it is possible to arrive at definitions of these terms and relationships that can be agreed on by partisans of all differing ideologies.
Next, the writer seeking accuracy of definition needs to key these political terms to a spectrum of positions from far right to far left in the United States and the rest of the world (see Appendix Two). Rather than speaking of "the liberal New York Times," one should explain and document the sense and degree of liberalism referred to. States is considered right-wing from today's European perspective, while many American "radicals" would be "moderates" in Europe. Similarly, many "ultraconservatives" in American terminology appear "moderate" in comparison to fascistic countries.) Therefore, in order to expose themselves to a full range of ideological viewpoints, students need to seek out sources excluded from the mainstream of American discourse, though such sources may be hard to find in many communities. The most prominent of these ideologies in a worldwide perspective are democratic socialism and libertarian conservatism (both of which favor political freedom), communism and fascism (both of which are opposed to democracy and freedom but are nonetheless strong presences in today's world and therefore need to be studied and understood through their own spokespeople and not just through the distorting filters of second-hand accounts).
Throughout this unit, and the rest of the course, the instructor needs to indicate the parameters of this kind of rhetorical analysis and the need for students to expose themselves, in history, political science, or economics courses, to more systematic analysis of ideologies and the way they have actually been implemented throughout the world.
Psychological Blocks to Perceiving Bias
The psychological factors that lead student writers and readers into partisan or biased arguments are an essential aspect of critical thinking and argumentative
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rhetoric that is inadequately emphasized in most conventional approaches to composition. (The growing body of recent scholarship applying the psychology of critical thinking "dispositions" and of cognitive and moral development to composition is useful theoretical and pedagogical background here; see my "Critical Thinking in College English Studies.") This unit-keyed, along with the following one, to Appendices Five through Seven-focuses on the most common psychological blocks to critical thinking that students should watch for in their sources for their term paper, as well as in themselves while reading and writing on these sources, and in their teachers in this and other courses. These blocks include culturally conditioned assumptions (which frequently emerge as hidden premises in arguments), closed-mindedness, prejudice and stereotyping; authoritarianism, absolutism, and the inability to recognize ambiguity, irony, and relativity of point of view; ethnocentrism and parochialism; rationalization, wishful thinking, and sentimentality. (Despite its brevity and simplicity, Ray Kytle's Clear Thinking for Composition is the most useful textbook I know on these blocks.)
The topic of prejudice provides a further occasion for consideration of opposing viewpoints on racial, sexual, and class bias. To avert a one-sided approach to these charged issues, it may be best to introduce them through psychological studies like Allport's The Nature of Prejudice, Rokeach's The Open and Closed Mind, or the developmental principles of Perry and Kohlberg and their feminist critique in Gilligan. In regard to subjectivity in political ideology in general, the beginning point here can be the hypothesis that many students have lived all their lives in a parochial circle of people who all have pretty much the same set of beliefs, so that they are inclined to accept a culturally conditioned consensus of values as objective, uncontested truth. (Most of the students at my school are middle-class whites, so middle-class ethnocentrism is the focus of study; this and other units of the course might need to be adjusted to differing pools of students.) Students need to become aware that what they or their sources of information assume to be self-evident truths are often-though not always-only the opinion or interpretation of the truth that is held by their particular social class, political ideology, religion, racial or ethnic group, gender, nationality and geographical location, historical period, occupation, age group, etc. Furthermore, we are all inclined to tailor our "objective" beliefs to the shape of our self-interest; consequently, in controversies where our interests are involved, we are susceptible to wishful thinking, rationalization, selective vision, and other logical fallacies. (A basic example of semantic cleans and dirties is that "biased" is a word that always applies only to arguments favoring the other side; we instinctively label arguments that confirm our own biases as "impartial," "well-balanced," "judiciously supported with solid research.")
Modes of Biased and Deceptive Rhetoric
While authorities used as sources, such as scholars, professional researchers or journalists, public officials, and business or labor executives can--or shouldTeaching the Political Conflicts: A Rhetorical Schema 201 be expected to have a more informed viewpoint than students on specialized subjects, students should be made aware that authorities are not immune from numerous causes of subjective bias. This unit, then, addresses modes of biased or self-interested arguments in sources, as well as of outright deception-another aspect of rhetoric inadequately addressed in many conventional composition and argumentation courses and textbooks that regard fallacious reasoning mainly in terms of impersonal, formal reasoning and unintentional fallacies. A more realistic approach to contemporary public discourse necessitates a systematic study of possible causes for bias (and the predictable rhetorical patterns they produce--see Appendix Seven) in conventional sources of information-including political partisanship, conflicts of interest, sponsored research and journalism, special pleading, and other forms of propaganda and pure lying that have come to be known as public doublespeak. The growing influence during the past twenty years of books and articles produced by scholars in research institutes like those in Appendix Three, whose sponsors-frequently foundations representing corporations or political lobbies with special interests in the subjects studied-calls for particular attention to the possible biases of such scholars.
Useful textbooks and teachers' guides for this unit include the works cited by Schrank, Harty, Lazere, Rank, Dieterich, and Lutz. The latter two were published by the NCTE Committee on Public Doublespeak, whose Quarterly Review of Doublespeak and annual Doublespeak and Orwell Awards are equally valuable classroom resources. These can be supplemented by comparative analysis of current issues of periodicals devoted to criticism of bias in media, such as Extra!, Propaganda Review, or Lies of Our Times on the left, versus AIM Report, Repap Media Guide, or MediaWatch on the right.
The next point to be made is that every ideology-political, religious, etc.-is predisposed toward its own distinct pattern of rhetoric that its conscious or unconscious partisans tend to follow on virtually any subject they are reading, writing, or speaking about. Critical readers need to learn to identify and understand the various ideologies apt to be found in current sources of information. Having done so, they can then to a large extent anticipate what underlying assumptions, lines of argument, rhetorical strategies, logical fallacies, and modes of semantic slanting to watch for in any partisan source. (See Appendices Five through Seven.) This is not to say that partisan sources should be shunned. Indeed, a clearcut, well-supported expression of a partisan position can be more valuable than a blandly non-partisan one. Nor does partisanship in a source necessarily go along with biased or deceptive reasoning. One must judge a partisan argument on the basis of how fully and fairly it represents the opposing position and demonstrates why its own is more reasonable. Some partisan authors or journals are highly admirable on this score (and students should be encouraged in their papers to cite such examples, not just fallacious or deceptive ones). Others, unfortunately, predictably repeat the same one-sided, doctrinaire line Lest this approach be misconstrued as an invitation to total relativity or scepticism, students are asked in the conclusion to their term papers not to make a final and absolute judgment on which side is right and wrong about the issue at hand, but to make a balanced summary of the strong and weak points made by each of the limited number of sources they have studied, and then to make--and support-their judgment about which sources have presented the best-reasoned case and the most thorough refutation of the other side's arguments. Grading for the paper and the course, then, becomes a matter of evaluating the quality of students' support for their judgments-regardless of what those judgments may be.
Conclusion
English faculties correctly resist attempts to make composition a "service course" providing only the technical skills needed for writing in other disciTeaching the Political Conflicts: A Rhetorical Schema 203 plines; however, composition can and should be a service course in the sense of fostering modes of critical thinking that are a prerequisite to studies in other disciplines-preeminently the social sciences-and to students' lifelong roles as citizens. To reiterate, this does not mean that composition should be turned into a social science. Nor does this conception of composition duplicate recent efforts to incorporate writing instruction within social science courses and other disciplines. Writing across the curriculum is a laudable enterprise, but it is not the same thing as what I am advancing, a program for studying political issues squarely within the discipline of English and through its distinctive humanistic concerns. By thus breaking through the arbitrary disciplinary constrictions that have diminished the scope of composition scholarship in recent decades, we can begin to restore the study of composition to its classical role as the center of education for citizenship. 
